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Moore’s paradoxes, Evans’s principle and self-knowledge
Moore’s paradoxes, Evans’s principle and 
self-knowledge
John N. Williams
I supply an argument for Evans’s principle that whatever justifies me in
believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show
how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in
a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show
how the principle helps to solve Moore’s paradoxes.
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1. Moore’s paradoxes
Moore observed (1942: 543) that to assert, ‘I went to the pictures last
Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. The paradox is
that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself
might be true. Moore did not notice that it is no less absurd of me to
silently believe such a possible truth. So a natural resolution is to explain
the absurdity of the belief in a way that identifies a contradiction-like
phenomenon but not with its content. The absurdity of Moorean assertion
can then be explained in terms of the fact that such an assertor expresses
an absurd belief (see Williams 1994: §6, 1996: §7 and 1998: §7).
Moore also observed (1944: 204) that to say, ‘I believe that he has gone
out, but he has not’ would be likewise ‘absurd’. Unlike his first example,
that has the omissive form
p & I don’t believe that p,
this has the commissive form,
p & I believe that not-p.1
This difference between the commission of a specific mistake in belief and
the omission of specific true belief is inherited from that between atheists
and agnostics.
2. Evans’s principle
Gareth Evans observes that
If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world
war?’ I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward
phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question
‘Will there be a third world war?’ ... We can encapsulate this proce-
dure for answering questions about what one believes in the following
simple rule: whenever you are in a position to assert that p, you are
ipso facto in a position to assert ‘I believe that p’. (1982: 225–26)
Assertions may be insincere, notably when they are lies. So Evans’s obser-
vation is best put as the rule that whenever I am in a position to sincerely
assert that p then I am in a position to sincerely assert that I believe that
p. This yields the principle that
Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing
that I believe that p.
1 Formalizing ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ as
‘p & ~ Bp’ turns ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ into ‘Bp & ~ p’.
This commutes to ‘~p & Bp’, which may be represented as ‘p & B~p’.
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Evans provides no reason for accepting this principle. But a simple argu-
ment for it is:
Circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances
that tend to make me believe that p.
Circumstances that tend to make it the case that I believe that p are
circumstances in which I am justified in believing that I believe that p.
Circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances
that justify me in believing that I believe that p.
The first premiss is plausible. For example, given that my apparent per-
ceptions of rain are generally reliable, they justify me in thinking that it
is raining. Such apparent perceptions of rain also tend to make me believe
that it is raining. This is the sense in which ‘seeing is believing’. The second
premiss is also plausible. For my apparent perceptions of rain are also
reliably connected with my coming to believe that it is raining. So my
apparent perceptions of rain justify both my belief that it is raining and
my belief that I believe that it is raining in virtue of different sets of reliable
connections.
This argument would hold for any form of justification. For example,
if my seeming to remember that it rained yesterday justifies me in thinking
that it indeed rained yesterday then that is because my apparent memories
are generally reliable. The very same basis justifies me in thinking that
I believe that it is raining because seeming to remember that it rained
yesterday is reliably connected with my coming to believe that it rained
yesterday.
The account also explains why I am normally the best authority on my
own beliefs. Suppose that you and I are both standing at the window
looking at the weather. In deciding whether I believe that it is raining I
simply decide whether it is raining. I may justifiably decide this on the
basis of my apparent perception of rain. But your apparent perception of
rain will not justify you in thinking that I believe that it raining. Instead,
you need to observe my verbal and non-verbal behaviour (as when I unfurl
my umbrella or say ‘It’s raining’) and then make an inference to my belief
that counts as the best explanation of my behaviour. Alternatively, you
may observe me observing the rain and then infer by analogy that since
you have come to believe that it is raining then so have I. In either case
you are liable to mistakes in observation. In the first case you may mistake
my tendency to play with my umbrella as a sign of interest in the weather
or mishear my question ‘It’s raining?’ as an assertion of rain. In the second
case you may mistake falling water from a hidden sprinkler for rain or
mistake my daydreaming at the window for my observation of weather.
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By contrast, I need only observe the weather. Nor do I need to make
any inference at all. So you are liable to error in ways that I am not. Of
course I may mistake falling water for rain. But in the second case that
mistake would not undermine my justification for correctly ascribing to
myself the belief that it is raining.
3. Self-knowledge
This account helps explain why whenever I come to know that p then I
also tend to come to know that I believe that p. For an internalist, the
normal case in which I come to know that it is raining by observing the
weather through the window is a case in which I acquire the true belief
that it is raining that is justified by my seeming to see rain. So I will tend
to also acquire a justified true belief that I believe that it is raining and so
will also tend to come to know that I believe that it is raining.
For an externalist, the normal case is that in which I acquire the true
belief that it is raining such that had it not been raining then I would not
have come to believe that it is raining. Since the genesis of my belief that
it is raining is actually the same as that of my belief that I now hold that
belief, namely my apparent perception of rain, it follows that had I not
come to believe that it is raining then I would not have come to believe
that I believe that it is raining. So again I will tend to come to know that
I believe that it is raining. On causal variants, the normal case is that in
which what makes it rain, namely the falling of water from clouds together
with my reliable eyesight, is what tends to make me think that it is raining.
So I will tend to acquire the true belief that I believe that it is raining, one
that is again caused by the falling of water from clouds together with my
reliable eyesight. So again I will tend to come to know that I believe that
it is raining.
If I were incapable of acting on Evans’s rule then I would be deeply
irrational. For then I could never use a method immune to third person
error. Nonetheless I may sometimes sensibly adopt your methods of jus-
tifiably ascribing beliefs to me. Suppose that you can tell from my boorish
behaviour towards women that my sincere assertion, ‘I don’t think women
are inferior’ is false. After you say, ‘But look at how you treat women!’ I
might start to observe my non-verbal behaviour and so discover my
repressed belief. This discovery would represent a therapeutic insight into
my lack of self-knowledge that should lead me to revise my beliefs for the
better. Before the insight, I believed that women were inferior but did not
believe that I held this belief. The most likely explanation of my self-
blindness is that there was no justification for my prejudiced belief that
women are inferior. For had it been available to me then that same
justification would have been available to me for thinking that I hold the
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belief that women are inferior. But now that I have recognized that I do
hold that belief, I should look for justification for it. Finding none avail-
able, I should abandon my prejudice.
4. Solving Moore’s paradoxes
One highly plausible principle is that
Whatever justifies me in believing that (p & q) justifies me in believing
that p and justifies me in believing that q.
Surely if my apparent perception of hot and humid weather justifies me
in believing that it is hot and humid then that same apparent perception
justifies me in believing that it is hot and also justifies me in believing that
it is humid.
Now suppose that I believe that (it is raining but I don’t believe that it
is raining). Suppose too that I have justification for believing this. Then
given the conjunctive principle above, I have justification for believing that
it is raining. By Evans’s principle, I enjoy the same justification for believ-
ing that I believe that it is raining. But by the conjunctive principle, I also
enjoy precisely the same justification for believing that I don’t believe that
it is raining. This is logically impossible, because anything that justifies
me in believing that something is the case renders me unjustified in
believing that it is not the case and vice versa. Likewise from an externalist
stance, any reliable method of acquiring the belief that p will be an
unreliable method of acquiring the belief that not-p and vice versa. So to
believe that I fail to believe the truth that it is raining is indeed irrational
unless it leads me to revise my beliefs. The natural way to do so would
be to give up my belief that I don’t believe that it is raining.
To explain my absurdity in holding the commissive belief that (it is
raining but I believe that it is not raining) we need the different principle
that
Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing
that I don’t believe that not-p.
This new principle is independently plausible. Surely if my apparent per-
ception of rain justifies me in thinking that it is raining, then it also justifies
me in thinking that I don’t hold the belief that it is not raining. Moreover
it follows from Evans’s principle, together with the assumption that I am
minimally rational and reflective. If I am at all rational then I will recog-
nize the fact that whatever justification I have for believing that p renders
me unjustified in believing that not-p. By Evans’s principle, whatever
justification I have for believing that p is justification for taking myself to
believe that p. But if I take myself to enjoy justification for holding the
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belief that p and recognize that this justification renders me unjustified in
believing that not-p then I should take myself as not believing that not-p.
Now suppose that I am justified in believing that (it is raining but I
believe that it is not raining). Then given the conjunctive principle, I again
have justification for believing that it is raining. By the new principle, this
means that I enjoy the same justification for believing that I don’t believe
that it is not raining. But by the conjunctive principle, I also enjoy precisely
the same justification for believing that I do believe that it is not raining.
This is logically impossible, as we saw above. To believe that I mistakenly
believe that it is not raining is indeed irrational unless it leads me to revise
my beliefs. The natural way to do so this time is to give up my belief that
it is not raining.2
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